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Purpose:  This research aimed to analyze the Public Choice Theory, from the opportunism point of
view, and the actions related to evidence of  corruption practices. As a focus of  investigated policy, the
study was focused on the Rio 2016 Olympic Games held in Brazil and the services hiring procedures.
Design/methodology: This was a qualitative and quantitative research, looking for official data and
media information.  The analyzed data were the audit reports issued by the Comptroller General  of
Brazil (CGU) and the news published by The Guardian and Le Monde, both from 2009 to 2016.
Findings: Regarding the audit reports, from 41 units, 17 presented inconsistencies about the bidding
process or execution after such procedure, and in some cases concomitantly, that indicates corruption
practices. Changing to the news, 34 from a sample of  38 units were analyzed.
Research  limitations/implications:  The  research  focuses  on  2009  to  2016,  but  even  with  this
limitation, it shows the main period that the news and investigations happened regarded to the Olympics
in Rio.
Practical implications: The results show that, according to the Public Choice Theory, the public agents
tend to make decisions that bring benefits only for themselves, not to the public in general. It is worse
when talking about a global event, like the Olympics, when all the eyes from the world are in only one
specific place.
Social  implications: These  documents  presented  actions  related  to  bribes,  illegalities  in  bidding
processes  and  investigations  related  to  politics  in  Brazil,  corroborating  the  Public  Choice  Theory
regarding opportunistic practices of  managers in the primacy for one policy over others. Even with
some politicians and public managers arrested at first, it didn’t last long. After some months, most of
them were free or under probation.
Originality/value: As the main contribution, this research shows the results of  a set of  media news
and official reports investigating the expenditures for hiring some key services for the Olympics that
happened in  Rio 2016.  Fraud and corruption evidences  were found in most  of  the cases analyzed
between 2009 and 2016.
Keywords: Audit in Prevention, Detection of  evidences of  corruption, Rio 2016 Olympic Games, corruption
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1. Introduction
Corruption can be explained under different prisms and it is related to small values and favor exchanges or can
cover the highest levels of  a government. At this level, as (Monteduro, Hinna & Moi, 2016)point out, corruption
produces  great  exchanges  of  advantages  and abuses  of  power,  and  eventually  permeates  the  structures  of
society.
Nowadays, these deviations are drawing attention, since corruption is recognized as a way of  deteriorating not
only the institutions or a system, but the entire legal and social structure of  a country (Monteduro et al., 2016;
Olmos, Bellido & Román-Aso, 2020; Pfleegor, Soebbing & Seifried, 2019). Its presence can be associated not
only with routine issues, but also with public policies aimed at meeting social demands and complying with the
legal functions and obligations of  the State.
These public policies are based on practices carried out by the managers of  a government, in which the Public
Choice Theory helps in the understanding of  the incentives that each agent receives in its action in a given
political system and the gaps arising from this relationship. James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in their book
"The Calculus of  Consent: Logical  Foundations of  Constitutional  Democracy" (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962)
emphasized this perspective.
It is observed that the exchange of  advantages related to public managers form the gaps where the possibility for
small  and  large  corruptions  arises,  as  in  the  case  of  the  choice  and  organization  of  the  Olympic  Games
throughout history (Dichter, 2016; Mason, Thibault &Misener, 2006; Matheson, Schwab & Koval, 2018).
Decker (2019) and Yavuz (2016) report that, specifically, the Olympic Games since its earliest days in 388 b.C.
have records of  bribery and other recognized illicit acts, pointing to a path that continues to the present day.
Nonetheless,  Lima (2016) states that  a democratic system based on reciprocal controls,  free press and with
internal and external control institutions, such as the Accounting Offices and the Brazilian Government Agency
for Law Enforcement, can minimize the opportunities for corruption that arise due to these incentives.
With the same thought, the audit carried out by the Comptroller General of  Brazil (CGU) has as its main scope
to evaluate the execution of  government programs, to verify their legality and to evaluate the results (Brasil,
2017b). The CGU also emphasizes the improvement of  the management and the correct execution of  public
policies that help in the fight against corruption from different perspectives.
Some researches emphasized in corruption and deviation from the rules, in addition to the sanctions eventually
obtained by fraudsters and the corruption perceived in each of  the events, as it was the case not only at the
Olympic Games, but also at  World Cups (Matheson et  al.,  2018; Olmos et al.,  2020;  Pfleegor et  al.,  2019).
However,  from the  point  of  view  of  investigations  and  performance  of  local  government  agencies,  such
researches did not have this focus, only analyzing the cases themselves.
This paper investigates the role of  the CGU audit in preventing and detecting evidence of  corruption in the
2016  Olympic  Games  in  Rio  de  Janeiro.  Therefore,  this  research  aims  at  understanding  the  main  findings
presented  in  the  CGU  audit  reports  for  2014,  2015  and  2016  and  how  they  help  in  understanding  the
mechanisms for preventing and detecting evidence of  corruption at the 2016 Olympic Games.
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Therefore, when having the corruption perception from the Public Choice Theory, this research contributes to
increase the understanding of  a contractual relationship in which the government should act in favor of  society
and use the resources that are managed, neither in favor of  their own interest nor in an opportunistic way. Thus,
the Public Choice Theory assists in understanding how to minimize political opportunism, as well as possible
behavior associated with corruption and illicit acts (Andreff, 2019; Banerjee, 2019). The research is justified not
only for the empirical evidence documented by the CGU in its audit reports, but also for other official boards
that presented demonstrations of  illegality related to the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.
The press also has a prominent role in this scenario, since it has widely publicized issues related to diversion,
fraud, bribes and even the purchase of  votes in the choice of  Rio de Janeiro as the venue for the 2016 Olympics,
which resulted in an operation of  the Brazilian Federal Police called Unfair Play.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Corruption
Corruption is a concept that is difficult to define itself. However, there is a consensus among authors who agree
that it’s everywhere and, in one way or another, it’s connected to the question of  human behavior throughout
history (Abdul, Yusoff  & Mohamed, 2019; Banerjee, 2019; Liu, Moldogaziev & Mikesell, 2017). The authors
state that one of  the difficulties related to the definition of  this topic is related to the dependence of  a country's
regulatory system, which may change the perception that corruption is from a legal point of  view.
For Jain (2001), the issue then becomes a problem when there is an attempt to define the concept of  corruption,
determination of  a specific model and how it can be measured. The author states that, despite the lack of  a
precise description, there is agreement that corruption is related to acts of  public managers. This would be linked
to personal gains that counter the rules of  the game in a nation.
Corruption occurs in a society, in an elementary way, when a position of  trust is used for private gain (Rose-
Ackerman, 1997). Within the public  sector, corruption is considered endemic and affects all  countries,  with
varying degrees of  intensity (Andreff, 2019).
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show that corruption in government is characterized by the sale of  public agents
motivated by personal gain. Some examples given by the authors are accepted bribes in exchange for licenses,
passage clearance at customs or a ban on competitors in the local market. These authors cite that corruption is
common in developing countries and that it usually compromises part of  the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Thus, corruption can be understood as damaging to the public interest  in general (Monteduro et al.,  2016).
Corruption can also be considered persuasive and, in some cases, essential for obtaining goods and services. In
these situations, someone pays an officer to assure certain property or something in return. In some African
countries, for example, not even direct bribery can ensure that certain objectives are achieved. In these cases,
other illicit maneuvers are necessary to obtain what is desired (Andreff, 2019; Clarke & Ojo, 2017). However,
there  are  no  limits  to  the  wrongdoing,  and  corruption  can  also  plague  democratic  and  developed  nations
(Matheson et al., 2018).
Jain (2001) divided corruption into three distinct types within democratic societies and related it to population
and politics,  to administrative issues and to the judicial elite.  These three types of  corruption differ  among
themselves and also in relation to the decisions that are influenced by them, by the source of  power or the
decision maker. It is at this moment that opportunism arises responsible for acts of  corruption.
“Great corruption” or high-level corruption is linked to elite political acts that exploit power to create or change
economic policies and rules. Jain (2001) argues that politicians should make decisions only in favor of  their
principals – the population – and for this they should evaluate their interests.
The second type of  corruption, the bureaucratic one, is also known as the “little corruption”. In these cases, Jain
(2001) states that the population needs to pay to receive services or to make them faster, such as those linked to
-16-
Intangible Capital – https://doi.org/10.3926/ic.1360
the judiciary of  a country. Legislative corruption refers to the behavior of  a legislator and how this can be
influenced by a group of  interests. This is the type of  corruption known as vote buying.
Specifically, in the great corruption, a corrupt elite appears when there is a change of  the national policies or
there is the implementation of  rules aiming the own interests instead of  the society ones.
The great corruption, besides a certain difficulty in its identification, also has obstacles in its measurement, since
some sectors of  the economy of  a country got benefits from the deviations that are generated by the crimes
committed. This type of  corruption usually also ends up involving the private sector, which is responsible for
payments for various government advantages (Olmos et al., 2020). Jain (2001) points out that this corruption can
be explained by models based on Agency Theory, where efficiency depends on the relationship between the
agent and the principal and the ability of  the agent to develop appropriate incentives for the agent.
The agent’s behavior, who is the public manager, is restricted by the principal's ability to define precise rules and
monitor this agent. The imprecision of  the rules and the costs of  monitoring the agent by the principal will
determine the leeway he has for corruption(Jain, 2001).
For Anderson and Hill (1986), this view of  government as a firm contracted by citizens presented in the Agency
Theory and used by them to obtain their most basic rights, in addition to any existing gaps and costs of  this
relationship, was explored by Buchanan and Tullock (1962), presenting itself  as an important contribution to the
Public  Choice  Theory.  This  concept  allows  the  understanding  of  how  to  minimize  some  aspects  of  this
relationship that can lead to corruption and that will be explored later in this paper.
Also from this perspective, Article 9 of  the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) adopted at
the UNODC General Convention in 2003 is a legally binding instrument against corruption. It recognizes the
dangers and impacts of  corruption (UNODC, 2013).
In this collection of  rules, this board criminalizes these acts by putting rules and measures to prevent, increase
the force of  international cooperation in the fight against corruption and ensure that the resources are returned
to the countries in which they have been diverted.
These rules, with the Handbook of  Good Practices to ensure compliance with Article 9 of  the United Nations
(UNODC, 2013), put forward mainly actions of  practices aimed at curbing actual acts of  corruption in biddings.
Rose-Ackerman (1997) points out several irregularities related to this process, emphasizing different gaps that
can be observed by the principal opportunistically to obtain advantages that can be considered as corruption.
2.2. Public choice theory and corruption
In public choices there are elementary concepts to define the action of  the people. Buchanan and Tullock (1962)
state that the decision-maker is an agent designed to manage a particular need in the name of  collective interest.
Therefore,  there  is  an individualist  dimension that  falls  on the  rationality  of  that  decision-maker  regarding
opportunistic issues in his actions.
Thus, existing contracts between individuals with common interests should be highlighted to minimize agency
problems. Such a problem arises from the contractual relationship of  one or more persons (the principal) with
another person (the agent), who will make decisions about a particular entity on his behalf.
The agency problem occurs when there is a conflict of  interest between the agent, who will act on the goal of
maximizing his or her particular welfare, and the principal, which should align their interests with those of  the
managers, causing agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
In the opportunist  perspective,  the Public  Choice Theory has as its  differential  the fact  of  assisting in the
management  aspects,  placing  the  agents  of  different  institutions  on an  equal  basis  as  everyone  will  act  to
maximize their interests, regardless of  whether or not they are in the capital market (Kelman, 1987; Mbaku,
2008).
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Nevertheless, this theory has its distinction as it can be considered as a branch of  the economy that analyzes how
the state, for example, makes its decisions in the public management, that is, how the public agents make the
decisions on taxes, expenses, forms of  regulation and other policies of  public interest (Adanali, 2017).
Understanding the behavior of  managers means that society can establish mechanisms to mitigate opportunistic
and altruistic behavior. Constitutional regulations represent one of  the ways found for private choices to meet
the choices that affect the welfare of  the community. In this area, the Public Choice Theory brings an approach
on constraints to avoid the opportunism of  managers, in order to limit, for example, corruption (Banerjee, 2019;
Liu et al., 2017).
There  are  limitations  in  verifying  all  clauses  that  could  be  within  a  contract,  motivated  among  other
circumstances by the costs of  monitoring. In post-contractual opportunism, for example, it happens that the
actions of  agents who violate established norms are motivated by opportunistic behaviors derived from the
agent-principal  relationship  within  the  public  sector  (Monteduro  et  al.,  2016).  Thus,  in  the  existence  of
incomplete contracts, corrupt public agents tend to direct greater compensation to the contractor. Along these
lines,  Iossa and Martimort (2016) point  out that  corruption is  a  threat  to  risk management and the agent-
principal relationship (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962).
Corruption  can have a direct  impact  on economic development  (Andvig,  Fjeldstad,  Amundsen,  Sissener  &
Søreide,  2001) and also on government policies.Seter,  Theisen and Schilling (2018),  in a  research in  Africa,
emphasizes  the corruption damages in  limiting the participation of  ethnic,  social  and racial  groups,  once a
domain relationship is established in which the minority of  political groups acts. Corrupt acts have repercussions
on efforts to the poverty.
In general, the absence of  restrictions on the managers’ behavior who have the power to regulate or manage
public resources leads to incentives in governments for the practice of  bribery, resulting in corruption (Abdul et
al., 2019; Banerjee, 2019; Liu et al., 2017).
2.3. Corruption in the Olympic Games
On the topic of  sports-oriented choices, there is evidence of  corruption, especially in the Olympic Games. They
appear in literature from the earliest times with the first documented corruption case in international sports
being  attributed  to  the  athlete  Eupolos  from  Thessalia.  The  sportsman  successfully  bribed  three  of  his
competitors in a fight at the first Olympic Games in history, in 388 b.C. (Decker, 2019; Yavuz, 2016). It’s also
reported other scandals surrounding the Olympics through the years with different types of  corruption.
The scandal  at the Salt  Lake City Olympic bid in 1988 contributed to a change in the organization of  the
International Olympic Committee. The intention was to mitigate acts that could interfere in the choices of  the
Olympic venues (Mason et al., 2006).
In the world scenario, the interest in conducting the Olympic Games can be explained by several factors. After
the Los Angeles games in 1984, it was noted that such an event would bring advantages beyond social issues
(Brittain, Bocarro, Byers & Swart, 2017; Mason et al., 2006). Political issues also drive the choice of  hosting such
an  event.  As  an  example,  the  games  in  Seoul  have  contributed  to  the  modernization  of  South  Korea.
Nevertheless, there is an Olympic legacy that theoretically stays for years within a country that has held this
event. The latter makes entrepreneurs and politicians want to foster the event in the country to be linked to their
particular legacy (Dichter, 2016; Lee, 2017).
Recently in Brazil evidences of  corruption in the 2016 Olympic Games were observed, mainly, in the hiring for
the execution of  services like construction of  infrastructure for the accomplishment of  the event. This finding is
showed in the audit reports carried out by the CGU to the Ministry of  Sports.
The resources applied in the 2016 Olympics were intended to provide a legacy that would make available to
society, in particular, equipped sports facilities and support for research into sports. As a result, the invested
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amounts were budgeted at around US$ 1 billion (Brasil, 2017a). The guarantee in this context would be focused
on the social welfare aiming at the quality of  the individual and his citizenship (da Costa, 2008).
In this  sense,  there is  a  special  attention to the investments associated with public  choices aimed at  sports
actions, which is the behavior of  managers in the interest of  performing a certain action to the detriment of
others and of  eventual benefited by these acts (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Mbaku, 2008).
Olmos et al. (2020) argue that corruption in sports occurs in a distinctive way, being used to achieve certain
opinions, which influence the allocation of  television rights or other types of  rights, or related to construction
and its contracts, representing a number of  issues never imagined.
3. Methodological procedures
This research is classified as descriptive and qualitative. Barbosa da Silva, Godoi and Bandeira-de-Mello (2010)
affirm that qualitative research does not seek regularities, but the understanding of  agents and what led them to
act. This paper is written through a documentary survey (secondary data) and content analysis.
In the documentary research, the available information of  the audit work was compiled with the Ministry of
Sports, responsible for the hiring and execution of  actions related to the Olympic Games in Brazil.
The first phase was characterized as a previous organization of  the analysis, a period characterized by intuitions,
but that sought the systematization of  ideas for the development of  operations aimed at the data exploitation
(Bardin, 2009).
In the content analysis, irregularities in hiring between the Ministry of  Sports and hired entities were identified
on the CGU reports. The audit reports and Annual Accounts Audit Reports are from 2014, 2015 and 2016.
A survey was also made based on the data analysis with press reports from 2009, with Rio de Janeiro being
chosen the venue for the Olympic Games, until 2016 when the event happened.
Some evidences were presented during 2017, related to the special operations of  the Brazilian Federal Police and
other events related to the investigation of  acts of  corruption and deviance occurred at that time. Therefore, the
steps of  there search are in accordance with the precepts enunciated by (Bardin, 2009): (a) survey of  inspection
and audit  reports related to the rendering of  accounts on the CGU’s website;  (b)  data analysis  content;  (c)
identification  of  irregularities  framed  as  suspected  corruption;  (d)  survey  and  analysis  of  news  with  the
international media.
The reports related to the 2016 Olympics and possible indications of  corruption were analyzed based on the
definition described in the literature (Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) and Article 9 of  the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2013), presented below.
Genre Characteristics Risk
Open bidding process. Any company can participate. The process is 
detailed and the winner should be the one 
who offers the lowest price.
Reduced risk of  corruption by open 
participation. This should be 
encouraged.
Restricted bidding process. In this type of  process only pre-selected 
companies can participate. It can occur when
an object is very specific.
It can have the risk of  mitigated 
corruption if  participants' credentials 
are required. Reasons for using this 
type of  procedure should be in the law
and should be applied restrictively.
Negociated bidding process. Only in case of  emergency. To mitigate the risk of  corruption it 
must be strictly defined in the law and 
should only happen in extreme 
situations.
Single participant bidding process. Only in case of  emergency. Higher risk / Favoritism
It should be documented, justified and
only occur in extreme situations.
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Genre Characteristics Risk
Publication of  bidding conditions. All requirements for participation in the 
bidding process must be detailed and 
published. Details of  the process should also
be published.
Essential requirement for transparency
in the process. Advertising ensures 
that the procedures applied are in 
accordance with the law and allows the
prosecution in case of  all steps have 
not been followed.
Pre-determined objectives as a 
criterion for participation in the 
bid.
This process should preferably be electronic. To avoid evidence of  corruption, the 
criteria for participation in a bidding 
process must be pre-determined. In 
addition, no drastic changes to the 
object should be made during the 
process.
Responsibility of  public managers
in the bidding process.
Conflict of  interest statements, screening 
procedures and training.
Corruption can be avoided in this 
regard by promoting standards of  
probity and integrity in all 
interpersonal relationships.
Budget. After the entire process there should happen 
the indication of  the use of  resources.
Evidence of  corruption may be 
related to very high costs and amonts 
out of  the market. The electronic 
processcan help mitigate these 
problems.
Table 1. Definition of  evidence of  corruption (UNODC, 2013)
In addition,  a  content analysis  of  possible  deviations  and illicit  indications  based on the Brazilian Auditing
Standards was carried out. Also, the legislation applied to the public sector was identified, as is the Act 4,320/64
(Darós & Pereira, 2009) and Act 8,666/93 (Brasil, 1993), Act 12,462/2011 (Brasil, 2011) and other standards laid
down by the CGU.
The chosen media was the British newspaper The Guardian, the third largest in the world and relevant in the
investigative area, winner of  the 2014 Pulitzer Prize for journalism, highlighting its global vigilance. In the area
of  sports, it shows several relevant reports related to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), International
Football Federation (FIFA) and other sports-related boards.
Complementary  information  was  used  in  the  French  newspaper  Le  Monde,  responsible  for  denouncing
payments to the IOC before choosing Rio de Janeiro as an Olympic city. Such news was analyzed using the
qualitative software Nvivo, version 10.
The  qualitative  data  analysis  in  this  point,  as  emphasized  by  Gibbs  (2009),  besides  the  manipulation  and
interpretation of  the data,  used the reduction of  these data in abstracts made from the use of  the chosen
software for the analysis. For this process, the data coding under analysis was used.
In this research it was used the concept-based coding that, according to Gibbs, can come from: (i) the research
literature, (ii) previous studies and (iii) and perceptions about what is happening, just as it was delimited in this
paper.
Following the concepts of  Gibbs (2009), were created concepts based on the observation of  the actors based on
acts and behaviors, events occurred, activities and practices observed, as well as consequences of  these acts and
the context observed around the news. Finally, the interpretative analyzes of  all the explored material as well as
the observed conclusions were made.
4. Analysis of  results
This work initially analyzed the monitoring and auditing reports performed by the CGU, the board in charge for
overseeing hiring between public entities and third parties, in conjunction with contracts signed between the
Ministry of  Sports and other private entities. Subsequently, the observations of  the media components related to
The Guardian newspaper were identified.
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Focusing first on the CGU reports,  the intention to verify the inspections with the Ministry of  Sports was
motivated because it’s responsible for carrying out various actions for the 2016 Olympic Games. Mainly related
to Program 2035 - Sports and Major Events / Action 20D8 - Preparation and Organization of  the Rio 2016
Olympic and Paralympic Games and Action 14TQ - Implementation of  Infrastructure for the Rio 2016 Olympic
and Paralympic Games.
The data refers to the years from 2010 to 2016, executed from 2014 to 2016. We found 48 audit reports, and 41
were related to contracts, partnership terms and agreements, 3 were related to the annual accountability and 4
were audit standards. In order to reach the research objective, the content analysis took place on the contracts,
terms of  partnership and agreements.
In order to filter these reports, the CGU's website that lists the audit reports made in states and municipalities,
program evaluations,  among others,  included the parameters “Ministry of  Sports” and “Publication Period”
between 2009 and 2016. After downloading such reports, those specifically related to the execution of  the Rio
2016 Olympic Games were considered for content analysis.
Firstly,  we  will  highlight  the  evidences  about  the  execution  of  public  money  made  by  those  who  signed
partnerships through contracts, agreements and terms of  partnership with actions 20D8 and 14TQ on the Rio
2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games.
From the 41 CGU audit reports found regarding partnerships between the Ministry of  Education and hired
entities, only one of  them was excluded, since it was not related to the actions highlighted in this research, as
follows:





Term of  Commitment Goods 05
Total 40
Table 2. Reports by type of  agreement and objects
The 27 reports are derived from agreements for the provision of  services. Included in such services are those to
support mainly the preparation of  teams of  athletes for the Rio 2016 Games. The highlights are the hiring
procedure to participate in the games, advisory services regarding the displacements of  the athletes and their
technical staff, consulting for the preparation of  projects and analysis of  facilities.
In some reports the compliance of  the bidding process was identified. Regularities were also identified during
the  execution  and  rendering  of  services  or  delivery  of  the  acquired  goods.  However,  in  other  processes,
consistency  was  indicated  only  in  the  execution  phase,  not  mentioning  other  phases.  Accordingly,  a
standardization of  CGU's analysis activities regarding the preparation of  audit reports was not detected in such
agreements between the Ministry of  Sports and other entities.
Specifically for this research, the focus was the inconsistencies related in the audit reports since they clarify facts
linked to possible corruption practice in public management. Thus, in the sample of  40 reports, in 17were found
inconsistencies, according to the following table.
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Typeofhiring Consistent quantity Inconsistent quantity Total quantity
Price competition (PC) 01 02 03
Invitation (IV) 00 03 03
Exemptions from bidding (EX) 00 07 07
Unenforceabilities (UN) 00 02 02
Differentiated hiring system (DH) 00 02 02
Princing (PR) 02 01 03
Total 03 17 20
Table 3. Reports by consistent and inconsistent quantity according to the type of  hiring
CGU attributed analyzes indicating that 12 (1 Price Competition, 2 Invitations, 6 Exemptions from Bidding, 1
Pricing, and 2 Unenforceabilities) did not carry out relevant disclosure in media, such as required under Act
8,666/93 (Brasil, 1993).
From the  7  processes  carried  out  as  Exemption  from Bidding,  in  5  there  was  no  justified  motivation  to
characterize the non-bidding, according to the precepts established in Act 8,666/93 (Brasil, 1993).
Jain (2001) points out that there is a relationship between disregard for legislation and the lack of  effectiveness
of  a country's legal system and also that this may lead to increased corruption by its political elite. Thus, CGU
notes demonstrating aspects regarding Act 8,666/93 (Brasil, 1993) characterize an attempt by the elite to reduce
them, the legal system manipulation in the allocation of  resources or even possible key positions within the legal
system itself, which causes corruption to spread further.
Regarding the opening to the participation of  other companies in such a huge event, that is, companies also with
technical capacity to provide a service or sale of  goods highlighted in the Term of  Reference (document that
discriminates the object of  hiring), thus contributing to the competition, there are indications that 6 Exemptions
from Bidding, 1 Unenforceabilities and 2 Invitations were restrictive, without considering more participants in
the hiring process.
It should be noted that in some types of  hiring, such as the Invitation, companies are chosen and invited due to
the specific products or services that they provide. As for the Unenforceability, the same is attributed when the
good or service to be acquired is something very restricted, as specified in Act 8,666/93 (Brasil, 1993). The main
remark regarding the restriction and use of  waysin disagreement with the hiring Act is in 6 Exemptions from
Bidding, indicating that this attitude of  the manager was conducted in order to benefit some to the detriment of
others.
With regard to UN precepts,  the non-opening of  hiring for  the  largest  number of  participants  indicates  a
restriction of  competition, thus impacting on a risk to the possible practice of  corruption (Matheson et al., 2018;
Rose-Ackerman, 1997; UNODC, 2013). In addition, in 3 Exemptions from Bidding, there were shortcomings in
the preparation of  budgets for the verification of  market values. In one of  the Price competitions and in one of
the Differentiated Hiring System there have been tacit failures related to the preparation of  the previous budget,
which serves as the basis for the hiring. For the UN (UNODC, 2013), values out of  the standards hired in the
market are also indications of  the practice of  corruption.  In this  sense,  to avoid it,  the observation is  that
electronic processes should be explored in public hiring.
In one of  the Pricings, the Bidding Announcement had only one page where all the requirements for the hiring
were not considered, such as the bidding mode (pricing), the type of  bidding (lower price and better payment
conditions) and the place, day and time of  the envelopes opening with the proposals. Indicating conditions in
bidding procedures mitigates opportunities for corruption (UNODC, 2013).
In one of  the exemptions there was a failure to detail the products, so that the measurement of  payments could
be carried out according to the delivery stages. An observation about another exemption is in the lack of  clear
definition of  the object, which may lead to payments that are not indicated in the contract. There is a concern to
make financial expenditures in order to accurately contemplate what is expected as products in such hiring.
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Also, regarding such exemptions related to the bidding procedure, CGU detected that in one of  the exemptions
the bidder did not observe the possibility that equivalent activities would be inserted in different agreements and
hired for the same period. As a result, there was duplication of  text translation and public relations services.
Therefore, there is waste of  resources due to double hiring.
In the same way as contracting in duplicate, the Ministry of  Sports incorporated to a Differentiated Hiring
System the implementation of  an air conditioning system, and this object was the responsibility of  a public-
private partnership between the City Hall of  Rio de Janeiro and the Rio Mais Consortium.
In addition,  in two exemptions, the peculiarities related to the hiring of  the information technology system
according to IN SLTI no.  04/2010 (Brasil,  2010)  regarding the  provision of  the  “Collaborative  System of
Projects” were also not observed.
In the  Price  competition,  it  was  also  observed that  participating companies  did  not  have expertise  for  the
construction of  an Olympic swimming pool. Such companies should be excluded from the process and not have
participated in the event.
With regard to the two Invitation processes, it was found that the bidding was conducted in order to benefit the
chosen  company.  The  facts  are  that  there  was  no  proof  of  invitation  to  potential  companies  that  could
participate in the bidding process. In addition, even though having a disqualification of  companies with conflicts
of  interest in the bidding procedures, it was found that the winning companies were also with the same issue,
characterizing, once again, favoritism in hiring.
UN argues that in these types of  hiring there is a risk of  corruption due to restrictions placed on participation
that  is  pre-established.  The way  to minimize  such practice  may be  through credential  requirements  of  the
participants, which did not occur in a timely manner in the Invitation modalities highlighted above. Moreover,
favoritism is a high risk for corruption (Olmos et al., 2020; UNODC, 2013).
In one of  the Invitations,  CGU detected that the amount established in  the acquisition of  equipment was
superior to that indicated in the previous budgets, indicating a loss of  public resources. The Table 4 summarizes
the main findings regarding the inconsistencies by type of  bidding according to Act 8,666/93 (Brasil, 1993).
Inconsistencies (Act 8,666/93) Quantity by type of  hiring
PC IV EX IN DH PR
Publication  01 06 02   
No justification to use the type of  hiring chosen   05    
Budget failures 01 03   01  
Failure to prepare the bidding announcement      01
Product detail failure   02    
Double hiring   01  01  
Participation of  companies without technical expertise to perform 
the contract 01      
Bid to benefit winning company 02      
No specific hiring observation   02    
Amount contracted in disagreement with budgeted 01      
PC = Price competition; IV = Invitation; EX = Exemption from bidding; UN = Unenforceabilities; DH = 
Differentiated hiring system; and PR = Pricing
Table 4. Inconsistencies by type of  bidding according to Act 8,666/93
Continuing the analysis on the 17 reports mentioned above, some highlights were made on the performance of
the contract. The first highlight is in payment failures. In one of  the Price competition cases, the contractor
made payments in disagreement with the law and that established in contract. In an Exemption from bidding
there were expenditures that were not foreseen in the work plan. For that which was foreseen, there was another
contract causing duplication of  payments and, as well as hiring of  accounting service without due justification.
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In another exemption, different from the previous one, the private company received a higher amount than
stipulated in the contract.
In one of  the Pricings, the company agreed to make payments before the delivery of  the equipment that were
object  of  the  contract.  In  another  contract  through  Differentiated  Hiring  System,  there  was  an  advanced
payment of  services not yet executed.
In addition to these, after hiring for Exemption from bidding between the Ministry of  Sports and other entities,
there were some irregularities regarding the conduct of  both the contractor and the private company.
In three Exemptions from bidding the execution of  services by personnel not belonging to the hired entity was
verified, which makes the option of  Exemption as established in Act 8,666/93 (Brasil, 1993) impossible. This
indicates that the hired company did not have personnel technically qualified to execute the agreed object, a
servicer, having to perform sub-hiring.
In addition, in another exemption from bidding, different from the ones mentioned in the previous paragraph,
the Secretariat belonging to the Ministry of  Sports authorized the execution of  clipping activities without it
being  in  the  scope  of  the  contract.  Also,  the  Ministry  authorized  the  execution  of  services  without  the
formalization of  the contract. This finding was based on invoices analyses that were certified by the products
delivery in conformity, with a date prior to the signing of  such agreement.
Similar to the previous one, there was another Exemption from Bidding in which there was authorization to
carry out clipping activities, not foreseen in the scope of  the contract. Sub-hiring was also carried out, making it
impossible to make the exception, since it should have technically qualified people in its human resources.
In one of  the Invitations, through an agreement, it was difficult to perform the audit of  the assets acquired,
since they had not yet been identified with records of  equity.
It was observed that in a Price competition and Exemption from bidding, using Terms of  Commitment, there
was a change in the basic project for the construction of  goods without technical team's endorsement, breaking
the bidding announcement forecasts of  such hired objects.
Finally, one of  the Exemptions signed by contract incurred in disagreement as to the payment of  taxes by the
contractor, as well as in inconsistencies in the calculation of  the amounts to be paid to Executive Coordinators
and Project Consultants. That is, the values were in disagreement with the original one in the National Register
of  Social Information, which should be the basis to receive the payment of  such activities. Table 5 presents a
summary of  the main findings in the later executions.
Inconsistencies in the execution Quantity by type of  hiring
PC IV EX UN DH PR
Undue payment  02 02  01 01
The contractor did not have in its human resources 
technically trained personnel   03    
Authorization of  execution of  service in discordance   02    
Failure to identify assets in a timely way 01      
Change in initial project without authorization 01  01    
Lack of  payment of  taxes   01    
Undue definition of  service payment   01    
PC = Price competition; IV = Invitation; EX = Exemption from bidding; UN = Unenforceabilities; 
DH = Differentiated hiring system; andPR = Pricing
Table 5. Executions after delivery of  the products or services
It is important to emphasize that on the inspection of  contracts and agreements signed between the Ministry of
Sports and private entities, it was verified that there were failures in the inspection of  such partnerships. The
evidence is that, in five contracts and four agreements, there was a failure in the management of  the activities
related to the inspection, resulting in timeliness in the information on the contractual execution.
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Regarding the use of  information published by the press, Cohen, Ding, Lesage and Stolowy (2010) considered a
form of  ex-post facto validation of  cases of  fraud in their article that verified facts of  illicit in the American
private area. Miller (2006) calls the press as the society's monitoring in the identification of  improprieties or
illicit, processing information of  public and restricted nature combined in an analysis that points out potential
problems. Based on these concepts the analysis of  media was delimited as follows:








Table 6. Media analysis of  the period
A protocol for the collection of  media information was set out in The Guardian newspaper. They were collected
through Google, with the determination of  parameters in “advanced search”. Another need of  the research was
the seek for words like “corruption”, “deviations” and others that were related to possible illicit or evidences of
such questions. News that does not have any relation with the proposed content, merely sporting matters or
other facts, have not been previously filtered for the analysis.
2016, which was exactly when the Games occurred, had the largest number of  related news. However, only 38
were selected by a criterion of  exhaustion of  the subject since the content analyzed already presented similarity
as to the news pressed. We have intentionally decided to use the first seven pages of  content presented by the
browser.
The year of  the Olympic Games in Rio totaled 38 selected news items and 34 analyzed, of  which 4 were later
discarded because they were not directly related to the theme, since they mentioned police violence, Rio local
elections, death of  a leader and a compilation of  other news. The same thing was observed in 2015, with 12
news items and 9 analyzed.
Following the  precepts  of  content  analysis,  it  was  defined  within the  software  Nvivo categories  for  events
analysis pointed by the press. The categories observed by the researchers were defined as follows:
Categories 2009 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Bribe/Construction/Bid   1   6 7
Electoralcorruption 1    1  2
Corruption in the Olympic Committee    1 1 6 8
Politiciansandpeople  1   5 20 26
Budgetaryproblems    1  6 7
Protests    2 3 3 8
Legacy    1 3 8 12
Totals 1 1 1 5 13 49 70
Table 7. Categories of  events observed in the research
The year 2009 presented only one occurrence related to the election of  Rio de Janeiro as host of  the Olympic
Games and possible indiscriminated use of  resources in corruption and as a form of  electoral roll, presenting a
possible opportunistic action of  the political agents involved. The year 2011 is presented, as well as 2009, with a
relatively low volume of  related news. However, the resignation of  the Minister of  Sports Orlando Silva for
possible involvement in corruption once again points to the opportunistic action of  agents and evidence of
corruption.
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The year  2013 is  marked by scandals  involving construction companies  and problems with bidding for the
construction of  World Cup facilities, which would also be used in the Olympic Games, pointing to the misuse of
public resources and favoring large companies.
In some news, more than one category of  possible illicit or press events were verified, such as in the case of
2014 in which issues were related to the corruption of  the International Olympic Committee, budget problems
in Rio de Janeiro, protests and a tendency of  identification of  eventual legacy of  the games for the city.
The year 2016, the largest in volume of  news for the games, also stands out for them involving research on
public  policies  and  people.  In  this  case,  the  investigation  of  former  president  Lula,  the  impeachment  of
President Dilma and the arrest of  former governor of  Rio de Janeiro Sérgio Cabral. All of  them were involved
in some act of  corruption and related directly or indirectly to the issue of  the games, constructors or other
Brazilian political events.
Corruption can be understood in different ways and acts in society corrupting institutions or systems as a whole.
Evidence of  corruption and illicit acts has always been associated with society, and specifically with the Olympic
Games, and with an event occurring in Rio de Janeiro in 2016 was no different (Maennig, 2005; Mason et al.,
2006; Matheson et al., 2018).
The Public Choice Theory points to the preferences of  the public agents as representatives of  the collective
interest, and as they are observed under an individualistic gaze, there are occasional opportunistic issues in their
actions (Gwartney & Wagner, 1988; Mbaku, 2008). To emphasize this perspective, the Public Choice Theory
explored by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) was used.
In this research, we sought to understand the choices made by politicians (agents) to maximize the collective
well-being  (principal)  and  the  possible  restrictions  to  combat  the  opportunism of  these  managers  to  limit
possible signs of  corruption.
The analysis focused on the definition of  corruption proposed in the literature (Banerjee, 2019; Pfleegor et al.,
2019), in the article 9 of  the United Nations Office of  Drugs and Crime Manual (UNODC, 2013), as well as in
the laws in force in Brazil to base the research findings.
Checking the findings presented in CGU's audit reports for 2014, 2015 and 2016, it was possible to observe
problems arising from the relationship between agent and principal as exposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976)
and that from an opportunistic perspective can explain possible acts of  management and political  decisions
made.  Some of  the  analyzed  points  presented  compliances,  but  the  inconsistencies  were  the  focus  of  the
research analysis. Consequently, 17 reports presented inconsistencies related mainly to the bidding procedure,
according to Matheson et  al.  (2018),  one of  the latent hypotheses of  evidence of  corruption and possible
deviations in the use of  public resources and choices of  political agents (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962).
Notes related to non-opening of  hiring procedures, exemptions from biddings, use of  an invitation letter not in
a timely manner, lack of  competition between companies in the market, sub-hiring of  companies by contractors,
disqualifying the bidding process, favoritism and other irregularities point to possible practices of  corruption
characterized by the UN (UNODC, 2013) in its document that aims to mitigate the main harms of  this type of
behavior.
As pointed out by Jain (2001), weaknesses in controls and political systems denote possibilities of  increasing
corruption and allow the manipulation of  public resources, contributing to corruption spreading even more.
Regarding the legacy, there was a tendency to increase the news. However, they point to the problems faced by
the city of  Rio de Janeiro. Among other subjects, they also characterized deviations, corruption, police violence,
lack of  planning among other problems.
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5. Conclusions
This  paper  aimed  to  investigate  the  role  of  CGU  audit  in  the  prevention  and  detection  of  evidence  of
corruption in the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016.
CGU inspection and audit reports were investigated as well as media content from The Guardian and Le Monde
newspapers. The press also stood out in this process by reporting the possible purchase of  the Olympic Games
in Rio de Janeiro among other evidences of  corruption.
The results evidenced transfers from the Ministry of  Sports to other hired, agreed or under partnership terms
entities, since this ministry was responsible for carrying out various actions for the 2016 Olympic Games. A total
of  41 reports were analyzed, being1 excluded because it was not related to the main subjects. From these, 20
documents were related to the acquisition of  services, such as preparation of  athletes and advisory services, and
the rest were related to goods and services, among others.
The analyzed points presented some compliances, but the inconsistencies were the focus of  the research analysis.
In the 17 analyzed reports, there were inconsistencies, mainly related to the bidding process, that established one
of  the latent hypotheses of  corruption and possible deviations in the use of  public resources, considering the
choices of  political agents.
Notes were made related to non-opening of  hiring processes, exemptions of  bidding, use of  invitation letter in a
not  timely  manner,  lack  of  competition  between  companies  in  the  market,  sub-hiring  of  companies  by
contractors, which disqualifies the bidding process, with latent evidence of  favoritism. Other irregularities point
to possible corrupt practices characterized.
The weaknesses identified in the controls and in the political system denote possibilities of  increasing corruption
and allow the manipulation of  public resources, contributing to systemic corruption in Brazil.
In the press analysis, the use of  information published in The Guardian and Le Monde shows acts involving
bribes, illegalities involving construction companies and bidding processes. The news on the investigation of
politicians such as former sports minister Orlando da Silva, former president Lula, impeached president Dilma,
former governor of  Rio de Janeiro Sérgio Cabral, arrested at the end of  2016, the president of  the Brazilian
Olympic Committee Carlos Arthur Nuzman, arrested in the middle of  2017 and other members of  the National
and International Olympic Committee are highlights. However, after some short time in jail, most of  them are
being released after legal maneuvers, which denotes the good payment for the corruption.
These findings point to the contribution of  institutionalized democracy in Brazil in the pursuit of  transparency
and accountability,  the  increasing  of  its  control  systems and also the  prominence of  the  free  press,  which
evidenced the importance of  the Accounting Offices, Brazilian Government Agency for Law Enforcement and
Comptroller General of  Brazil, in mitigating the opportunism of  public agents.
The limitations of  this research are based on the scope of  the investigation carried out that sought to analyze the
available content by the official control board that conducted the audit and the newspapers The Guardian and Le
Monde. Although this approach developed through the content analysis did not affect the survey orthe findings
proposed in this research, it presented in a systematic way the results.
A suggestion for further research would be to conduct event studies relating notorious facts by crossing evidence
of  corruption and other illicit elements, with the outcomes of  ongoing investigations in the Brazilian justice and
the repercussion in the Brazilian and world wide societies.
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